Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences. by Peleg, Bezalel et al.
Abstract. A game form constitutionally implements a social choice corre-
spondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the asso-
ciated eﬀectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be
constitutionally implementable, and suﬃcient and almost necessary condi-
tions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be
constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to inter-
esting classes of scoring and veto social choice correspondences.
Key words: Social choice correspondence, game form, eﬀectivity function,
constitutional implementation.
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1. Introduction
Starting point of this paper is the traditional social choice framework with a
ﬁnite number of agents (or players) and a ﬁnite number of alternatives. A
social choice correspondence assigns to each proﬁle of preferences a non-
empty set of alternatives. In a mechanism or game form, each player is
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Final version: March 2004endowed with a set of strategies, and an outcome function assigns to each
proﬁle of strategies an alternative. A game form implements a social choice
correspondence (in Nash equilibrium) if for each proﬁle of preferences the
set of alternatives assigned by the social choice correspondence coincides
with the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the associated game (cf.
Hurwicz, 1972; Maskin, 1985; Danilov, 1992; Yamato, 1992).
Thesocialchoicecorrespondencecanbeseenasacentralizedprocedurethat
reﬂects an underlying constitution. More precisely, a social choice correspon-
dence endows each group of agents with a certain ‘constitutional’ power.
Formally, this power or constitution can be represented by the eﬀectivity
function derived from the social choice correspondence (cf. Ga ¨ rdenfors, 1981;
Moulin and Peleg, 1982; Peleg, 1984; Peleg, 1998; Abdou and Keiding, 1991).
A game form is a decentralized procedure and also endows each group of
agents (players) with a certain power, again represented by its associated
eﬀectivity function (cf. Gaertner et al., 1992). If a game form implements a
given social choice correspondence, then the right alternatives—‘right’ in
terms of the constitution underlying the social choice correspondence—are
attained in a decentralized manner (so by the agents’ own choice) as long as
a Nash equilibrium is played. Thus, we assume that the agents make deci-
sions on their own, and do not form coalitions. Nevertheless, we want to
make sure that, if players deviate, then the game form does not give them
more power than they had originally in the social choice correspondence.
(Deviation does not necessarily imply that players form coalitions. For in-
stance, in a natural setting where the game form is played repeatedly, non
(stage-game) equilibrium behavior is standard but does not imply coalition
formation.) Thus, we need additional restrictions on the game form that
guarantee the maintenance of the constitution underlying the social choice
correspondence.
Following Peleg and Winter (2002) we will formalize this by considering
so-called constitutional implementation, which requires that the game form
not only implements a social choice correspondence but also has the same
associated eﬀectivity function. In other words, the game form endows each
group of agents with exactly the same power as the social choice corre-
spondence.
Alternatively, one may consider implementation in strong Nash equilib-
rium (hence coalitions cannot proﬁtably deviate). This is much more
demanding: in particular, it implies constitutional implementation in strong
Nash equilibrium (see Peleg and Winter, 2002, for discussion).
The ﬁrst main result is a tight characterization of all unanimous social
choice correspondences that are constitutionally implementable. The condi-
tions involved are (Maskin) monotonicity; full power of n   1-person coali-
tions (n is the number of agents); and a condition requiring that if two disjoint
coalitions are eﬀective for two sets of alternatives, then every alternative must
be in at least one of these sets. The second main result gives suﬃcient and
‘almost’ necessary conditions for constitutional implementation of social
choice correspondences that are not necessarily unanimous but only surjec-
tive. By discussing exemplary classes of scoring and veto social choice cor-
respondences we show that this last result enables us to establish
constitutional implementation of interesting but non-unanimous social choice
correspondences.
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mentable unanimous social choice correspondences were already identiﬁed as
necessary conditions in Peleg and Winter (2002). The same is true for con-
dition (S1) used in the result on surjective social choice correspondences.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After preliminaries in
Section 2, we discuss constitutional implementation of unanimous and
surjective social choice correspondences in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In
Section 5 we present the mentioned examples and show independence of
the characterizing conditions. Section 6 concludes.
Notations. For a set D,2 D denotes the set of all subsets of D, and PðDÞ the
set of all nonempty subsets. By jDj we denote the number of elements of D.
2. Preliminaries
Let A be the nonempty (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of alternatives. Throughout we
assume jAj 2, in order to avoid trivialities. A preference R on B   A is a
complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on B. The set of all
preferences on B is denoted by LðBÞ. For R 2 LðAÞ, RjB denotes the restriction
to B. We will also use notations like xRB (alternative x is (weakly) preferred to
all elements of B), B0RB (every alternative in B0 is (weakly) preferred to every
alternative in B), etc.
Let N ¼f 1;...;ng be the (ﬁnite) set of players. Throughout we assume
n   3. An n-tuple RN 2 LðAÞ
N is called a preference proﬁle. Similarly, for a
coalition S 2 PðNÞ, RS denotes a preference proﬁle for S, i.e., an element of
LðAÞ
S.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) H assigns to every preference proﬁle
RN a nonempty subset HðRNÞ of A. An SCC H is called surjective if for every
x 2 A there is an RN 2 LðAÞ
N such that fxg¼HðRNÞ. It is called unanimous if
HðRNÞ¼f xg for all RN 2 LðAÞ
N and x 2 A such that xRiA for all i 2 N.
Obviously, unanimity of an SCC implies surjectivity.
A game form is an ðn þ 1Þ-tuple C ¼ð R1;...;Rn;pÞ where
(i) for each player i 2 N, Ri is a nonempty set of strategies;
(ii) p : R1      Rn ! A is a surjective map called the outcome function.
By RS (S 2 PðNÞ) we denote the product
Q
i2S Ri. An element of RS is
called a strategy proﬁle (for S). For RN 2 LðAÞ
N the pair ðC;RNÞ is a game
in strategic form in the obvious way. A strategy proﬁle r 2 RN is a Nash
equilibrium of ðC;RNÞ if pðrÞRipðrNnfig;siÞ for all si 2 Ri and i 2 N. The set
of all Nash equilibria of the game ðC;RNÞ is denoted by NEðC;RNÞ.
An eﬀectivity function is a map E : 2N ! 2PðAÞ such that
(i) Eð;Þ ¼ ;;
(ii) EðNÞ¼PðAÞ;
(iii) A 2 EðSÞ for every S 2 PðNÞ.
An eﬀectivity function E is monotonic if B 2 EðSÞ implies B0 2 EðS0Þ for all
B;B0 2 PðAÞ and S;S0 2 PðNÞ with B   B0 and S   S0.I ti ssuperadditive if
B \ B0 2 EðS [ S0Þ for all B;B0 2 PðAÞ and S;S0 2 PðNÞ with B 2 EðSÞ,
B0 2 EðS0Þ,a n dS \ S0 ¼; .
Let H be a surjective SCC. We associate with H an eﬀectivity function EH,
as follows. Deﬁne EHð;Þ ¼ ; and for B 2 PðAÞ and S 2 PðNÞ let B 2 EHðSÞ if
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S such that HðRS;QNnSÞ B for every
preference proﬁle QNnS 2 LðAÞ
NnS. Note that, in particular, EHðNÞ¼PðAÞ by
surjectivity of H,s oEH is well deﬁned. It is easy to see that EH is monotonic
and superadditive.
Similarly, we can associate an eﬀectivity function EC with a game form
C ¼ð R1;...;Rn;pÞ, as follows. Deﬁne ECð;Þ ¼ ; and for B 2 PðAÞ and
S 2 PðNÞ let B 2 ECðSÞ if there is a strategy proﬁle rS 2 RS such that
pðrS;sNnSÞ2B for every strategy proﬁle sNnS 2 RNnS. In particular,
ECðNÞ¼PðAÞ by surjectivity of p,s oEC is well deﬁned. It is again easy to see
that EC is monotonic and superadditive.
The game form C implements the social choice correspondence H (in Nash
equilibrium) if pðNEðC;RNÞÞ ¼ HðRNÞ for every preference proﬁle
RN 2 LðAÞ
N.I fH is surjective, then C constitutionally implements H if C
implements H and EC ¼ EH.
We conclude this section with introducing the following notation. For a
preference R 2 LðAÞ and an alternative a 2 A let Lða;RÞ :¼f x 2 A j aRxg be
the set of all alternatives to which a is (weakly) preferred. Observe that
a 2 Lða;RÞ.
3. Constitutional implementation of unanimous social choice correspondences
The social choice correspondence H is (Maskin) monotone if for all RN,
QN 2 LðAÞ
N and a 2 HðRNÞ such that Lða;RiÞ Lða;QiÞ for all i 2 N, we have
a 2 HðQNÞ. Monotonicity of H is a necessary condition for implementability
(cf. Maskin, 1985).
An alternative a 2 A is Pareto undominated in a preference proﬁle
RN 2 LðAÞ
N is there is no alternative b 2 Anfag with bRia for all i 2 N. The
SCC H is Pareto optimal if, for every RN 2 LðAÞ
N, HðRNÞ contains only
Pareto undominated alternatives.
Lemma 3.1. Let the SCC H be unanimous and monotone. Then H is Pareto
optimal.
Proof. Let RN 2 LðAÞ
N and a 2 HðRNÞ and suppose, contrary to what we wish
to prove, that there is a b 2 Anfag such that bRia for all i 2 N. Consider the
proﬁle ~ RN with ~ RijAnfbg¼RijAnfbg and b~ RiA for all i 2 N. By monotonicity,
a 2 Hð~ RNÞ, but by unanimity, fbg¼Hð~ RNÞ. This is a contradiction, hence a is
Pareto undominated in RN. We conclude that H is Pareto optimal. j
Call the SCC H dictatorial if there is an i 2 N, the dictator, such that, for
all RN 2 LðAÞ
N, HðRNÞ¼f xg where xRiA. Obviously, a dictatorial social
choice correspondence is unanimous and constitutionally implementable, e.g.
by the game form in which every player announces a preference and the
outcome function picks the best alternative of the dictator. The purpose of
this section is to present necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a nondicta-
torial unanimous SCC to be constitutionally implementable.
Proposition 3.2. Let H be an SCC. If H is implementable, then H is monotone.
If H is unanimous, nondictatorial, and constitutionally implementable then,
moreover, the following two conditions hold. [(U1)] For all B;B0 2 PðAÞ and
384 B. Peleg et al.S;S0 2 PðNÞ with B 2 EHðSÞ, B0 2 EHðS0Þ, and S \ S0 ¼; , we have B [ B0 ¼ A.
[(U2)] For all i 2 N, we have EHðNnfigÞ ¼ PðAÞ.
Proof. For the ﬁrst statement, see Maskin (1985). Condition (U2) follows
from Theorem 6.2 in Peleg and Winter (2002). Condition (U1) follows from
Lemma 3.1 above and Lemma 6.3 in Peleg and Winter (2002). j
The interpretation of (U2) is obvious. Note that for anonymous SCCs
(where the names of the players do not matter) condition (U1) is equivalent to
the condition that EHðSÞ 6¼f Ag implies jSj > n=2, for all S 2 PðNÞ.
We will show that the conditions in Proposition 3.2 are also suﬃcient for
constitutional implementation of a unanimous SCC. We start with an aux-
iliary result on monotone SCCs.
Lemma 3.3. Let H be a monotone SCC, S 2 PðNÞ, and B 2 EHðSÞ. Then there
is a preference proﬁle ^ RS 2 LðAnBÞ
S such that, if RN 2 LðAÞ
N and for all i 2 S:
(i) RijAnB ¼ ^ Ri; and
(ii) BRiAnB, then HðRNÞ B.
Proof. Since B 2 EHðSÞ, there is a preference proﬁle   RS 2 LðAÞ
S such that
Hð  RS;RNnSÞ B for all RNnS 2 LðAÞ
NnS. For every i 2 S deﬁne ^ Ri 2 LðAÞ by
^ RijB ¼   RijB, ^ RijAnB ¼   RijAnB, and B^ RiAnB. Let RN 2 LðAÞ
N be as in the
statement of the lemma. Suppose x 2 HðRNÞ for some x 2 AnB. Then by
monotonicity, x 2 Hð  RS;RNnSÞ, hence x 2 B, a contradiction. Hence,
HðRNÞ B. n
We now present the main result of this section.
Proposition 3.4. Let H be a unanimous and monotone social choice corre-
spondence satisfying (U1) and (U2). Then H is constitutionally implementable.
Proof. We construct a game form C ¼ð R1;...;Rn;pÞ, as follows. For each
i 2 N, the strategy set Ri consists of all ﬁve-tuples of the form ðRN;x;t;S;BÞ
where RN 2 LðAÞ
N, x 2 HðRNÞ, t 2f 0;1;2;...g, S   N with i 2 S, and
B 2 EHðSÞ. Let rN 2 RN. For the deﬁnition of the outcome pðrNÞ we distin-
guish three cases:
[ðaÞ] There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N and x 2 Hð  RNÞ such that ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ for
all i 2 N. Then pðrNÞ :¼ x.
[ðbÞ] There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N, x 2 Hð  RNÞ, and k 2 N such that
ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ and rk ¼ð   ;xk; ; ; Þ 6¼ ri for all i 2 Nnfkg. Then
pðrNÞ :¼ xk if x  Rkxk and pðrNÞ :¼ x otherwise.
[ðcÞ] Neither ðaÞ nor ðbÞ hold. For the strategy proﬁle rN, call a pair ðT;BÞ
with 1 < jTj < n   1, 1  j Bj < jAj, T 2 PðNÞ, and B 2 EHðTÞ decided if
ri ¼ð   ; ;0;T;BÞ for all i 2 T. Let D ¼f ð T 1;B1Þ;...;ðT ‘;B‘Þg be the set
of all decided pairs for rN. Let D ¼
T‘
l¼1 Bl if D 6¼; , and D ¼ A if
D ¼; . (Observe that, for
S‘
l¼1 T l 6¼; , D 2 EHð
S‘
l¼1 T lÞ by superaddi-
tivity of EH. Otherwise, D ¼ A.) Let k be the player who announces the
highest t in rN; in case of a draw, take from those players the one with
the highest number. If rk ¼ð RN; ; ; ; Þ, then pðrNÞ :¼ x where x 2 D
such that xRkD.
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(i) C implements H.
Let ~ RN 2 LðAÞ
N.
Take a 2 Hð~ RNÞ. Consider the strategy ri ¼ð~ RN;a;0;N;fagÞ. By case ðaÞ,
pðrNÞ¼a. We show that rN is a Nash equilibrium of ðC; ~ RNÞ. Suppose a
player k deviates to s ¼ð   ;xk; ; ; Þ. By case ðbÞ, pðrNnfkg;sÞ is equal to a or
equal to xk if a~ Rkxk. Hence, pðrNÞ~ RkpðrNnfkg;sÞ.S orN 2 NEðC; ~ RNÞ, and
Hð~ RNÞ pðNEðC; ~ RNÞÞ.
For the converse, take rN 2 NEðC; ~ RNÞ and let a ¼ pðrNÞ. We distinguish
three cases, according to the deﬁnition of pðrNÞ.
(a) There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N and x 2 Hð  RNÞ such that ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ for
every i 2 N. Then pðrNÞ¼x ¼ a and in particular a 2 Hð  RNÞ. Take
k 2 N and y 2 Lða;   RkÞ arbitrary, and let RN 2 LðAÞ
N be a preference
proﬁle with yRjA for all j 2 N. By unanimity, HðRNÞ¼f yg,s o
s ¼ð RN;y;1;N;fygÞ is a well deﬁned strategy in Rk. By case ðbÞ, we have
pðrNnfkg;sÞ¼y, and since rN is a Nash equilibrium in ðC; ~ RNÞ, we have
pðrNÞ~ RkpðrNnfkg;sÞ. Hence, a~ Rky, and since y was an arbitrary element of
Lða;   RkÞ, it follows that Lða;   RkÞ Lða; ~ RkÞ. Since also k was arbitrary and
a 2 Hð  RNÞ, we have by monotonicity of H that a 2 Hð~ RNÞ.
(b) There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N, x 2 Hð  RNÞ, and k 2 N, such that
ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ and rk 6¼ ri for every i 2 Nnfkg. Let
rk ¼ð   ; ;tk; ; Þ. Take an arbitrary y 2 A and a proﬁle RN with yRjA for
all j 2 N. By unanimity, HðRNÞ¼f yg. For an arbitrary player
i 2 Nnfkg, consider the strategy si ¼ð RN;y;tk þ 1;fig;AÞ, so that, with
si, player i announces the largest number. Then pðrNnfig;siÞ is determined
by case ðcÞ. Since there are no decided pairs in this strategy proﬁle, we
have D ¼ A and pðrNnfig;siÞ¼y. Since rN is a Nash equilibrium of
ðC; ~ RNÞ, we have pðrNÞ~ RipðrNnfig;siÞ,s opðrNÞ~ Riy. Since y 2 A and
i 2 Nnfkg were arbitrary, we have
pðrNÞ~ RjA for all j 2 Nnfkg: ð1Þ
By condition (U2), fag2EHðNnfkgÞ. Hence, by Lemma 3.3, there is a proﬁle
^ RNnfkg 2 LðAnfagÞ
Nnfkg such that HðQNnfkg; ~ RkÞ¼f ag, where aQiA and
QijAnfag¼^ Ri for all i 2 Nnfkg. By (1) and monotonicity,
a ¼ pðrNÞ2Hð~ RNÞ.
(c) Neither ðaÞ nor ðbÞ. Let D ¼f ð T 1;B1Þ;...;ðT ‘;B‘Þg, D, and k be as in the
deﬁnition of case ðcÞ. Let si ¼ð RN;y;tk þ 1;fig;AÞ for an arbitrary i 2 N
be deﬁned exactly as in case (b) above.
If D ¼;then D ¼ A. Since pðrNÞ~ RipðrNnfig;siÞ and pðrNnfig;siÞ¼y, we have
pðrNÞ~ Riy. Since both i 2 N and y 2 A were arbitrary, we have pðrNÞ~ RiA for all
i 2 N. By unanimity, a ¼ pðrNÞ2Hð~ RNÞ.
If D 6¼;then let, for each h 2f 1;...;‘g, Dh :¼
T
fBl j l 2f 1;...;‘gnfhgg,
with D1 :¼ A if ‘ ¼ 1. Consider h 2f 1;...;‘g and i 2 T h. Take y (as in si)i n
Dh. Then pðrNnfig;siÞ¼y by case ðcÞ.A spðrNÞ~ RipðrNnfig;siÞ, and y 2 Dh, h,
and i 2 T h were arbitrary, we have:
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In exactly the same way we prove:















where ðBhnDhÞ _ RipðrNÞ _ RiðDnfpðrNÞgÞ _ RiðDhnBhÞ and _ RijAnBh ¼ ^ Ri, for every
h 2f 1;...;‘g and i 2 T h. By superadditivity it follows, in particular, that
Hð _ RT1






Since, by construction, pðrNÞ _ RiD for all i 2
S‘
h¼1 T h and, by (3), pðrNÞ~ RiD for
all i 2 Nn
S‘
h¼1 T h, we have by Pareto optimality (Lemma 3.1) that
Hð _ RT1





Þ¼f pðrNÞg ¼ fag: ð4Þ
Let h 2f 1;...;‘g and i 2 T h. By (U1), Bh [ Dh ¼ A, hence Lða; _ RiÞ¼
AnðBhnDhÞ¼Dh. Since, by (2), Dh   Lða; ~ RiÞ, we have Lða; _ RiÞ Lða; ~ RiÞ.
Since h and i 2 T h were arbitrary, (4) and monotonicity imply a 2 Hð~ RNÞ.
By cases (a), (b), and (c), we have pðNEðC; ~ RNÞÞ   Hð~ RNÞ. This completes
the proof that C implements H.
(ii) EC ¼ EH.
First, let k 2 N and consider Nnfkg. By (U2) it is suﬃcient to prove
ECðNnfkgÞ ¼ PðAÞ. Let x 2 A arbitrary. By monotonicity of EC it is suﬃcient
to prove that ECðNnfkgÞ contains fxg. By (U2) we can take a preference
proﬁle   RN 2 LðAÞ
N such that Hð  RNÞ¼f xg and A  Rkx. For every i 2 Nnfkg let
ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ. By cases ðaÞ and ðbÞ we have pðrNnfkg;skÞ¼x for all
sk 2 Rk. Hence, ECðNnfkgÞ ¼ fxg, as was to be proved.
Second, since we have just proved ECðNnfkgÞ ¼ EHðNnfkgÞ ¼ PðAÞ for all
k 2 N, it follows by superadditivity of EC and EH that ECðfkgÞ ¼
EHðfkgÞ ¼ fAg for every player k.
It remains to consider coalitions S with 1 < jSj < n   1. Let B 2 EHðSÞ,
without loss of generality B 6¼ A. Consider an x 2 A and a strategy proﬁle   RN
with x  RiA for all i 2 N,s oHð  RNÞ¼f xg by unanimity. Let ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;S;BÞ
for every i 2 S. Since 1 < jSj < n   1, pðrS;sNnSÞ is determined by case ðcÞ for
every sNnS 2 RNnS. Obviously, ðS;BÞ is a decided pair in every such strategy
proﬁle ðrS;sNnSÞ, so that pðrS;sNnSÞ2B. This proves B 2 ECðSÞ.
Finally, let B 2 ECðSÞ, without loss of generality B 6¼ A. Take a strategy
proﬁle rS 2 RS with pðrS;sNnSÞ2B for all sNnS 2 RNnS. With   RN and x as in
the preceding paragraph, consider a strategy si ¼ð  RN;x;ti;fig;AÞ2Ri for
every i 2 NnS. Since jSj < n   1, pðrS;sNnSÞ is determined by case ðcÞ. Let
ðT 1;B1Þ, ..., ðT ‘;B‘Þ, D, and k be as in the deﬁnition of pðrS;sNnSÞ in ðcÞ.B y
the choice of si for i 2 NnS, we have
S‘
l¼1 T l   S. By varying x in the deﬁ-
nition of si over D and choosing ti high enough, we obtain that the range of
pðrS; Þ is D. Hence, D   B. By superadditivity, D ¼
T‘
l¼1 Bl 2 EHð
S‘
l¼1 T lÞ.
Thus, by monotonicity of EH, B 2 EHðSÞ.
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences 387This completes the proof of (ii), and of the proposition. j
Roughly, the game form used in the proof of this proposition works as
follows. Parts (a) and (b) by themselves make sure that, for any preference
proﬁle, any outcome in the SCC can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium in the
game. Of course, there are many other strategy proﬁles in the game: part (c)
makes sure that these do not lead to Nash equilibria with outcomes not
assigned by the SCC. The three parts together imply that the associated
eﬀectivity functions are equal, hence that the implementation is
constitutional. In fact, the game form is a combination of the Maskin game
form (Maskin, 1985) and the game form of Moulin and Peleg (1982), which
represents the eﬀectivity function: the strategy sets are the Cartesian product
of the strategy sets of these two game forms.
By combining Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 the following corollary results.
Corollary 3.5. Let H be a unanimous and nondictatorial social choice corre-
spondence.Then H is constitutionally implementable if and only if it is monotone
and satisﬁes (U1) and (U2).
Peleg and Winter (2002) provide an example of a unanimous SCC that is
implementable but not constitutionally implementable (their Example 3.2).
Another class of closely related SCCs is described in the following example,
discussed earlier in Peleg and Winter (2002, Remark 4.8).
Example 3.6. Fix a nonempty coalition T and let the eﬀectivity function ET
assign PðAÞ to every coalition containing T and fAg to every nonempty
coalition not containing T. For a preference proﬁle RN 2 LðAÞ
N, call x 2 A
undominated if there is no coalition S and B 2 ETðSÞ such that BRix for
every i 2 S. The core CðET;RNÞ is the set of all undominated alternatives. It
is easy to see that CðET;RNÞ consists of all alternatives that are Pareto
undominated in RT. Hence, CðET; Þ is a well-deﬁned and unanimous SCC.
It is Nash implementable (see Lemma 3.3 in Peleg and Winter, 2002) but
not constitutionally implementable: in particular, it does not satisfy (U2).
4. Constitutional implementation of surjective social choice correspondences
In this section we consider the larger class of surjective social choice corre-
spondences. As observed, surjectivity is implied by unanimity. In the context
of implementability and, thus, of (Maskin) monotonicity, surjectivity implies
the following weakening of unanimity. Call the SCC H weakly unanimous if
x 2 HðRNÞ for all RN 2 LðAÞ
N and x 2 A such that xRiA for all i 2 N.
Lemma 4.1. Let the SCC H be monotone and surjective. Then H is weakly
unanimous.
Proof. Let x 2 A and RN 2 LðAÞ
N with xRiA for all i 2 N. By surjectivity there
is a proﬁle ^ RN 2 LðAÞ
N with fxg¼Hð^ RNÞ. By monotonicity, x 2 HðRNÞ. n
In this section we give a set of necessary and a set of suﬃcient conditions
for constitutional implementation of a surjective social choice correspon-
dence. We start with a necessary condition.
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Then
[(S1)] for all i 2 N, RN 2 LðAÞ
N,and a 2 HðRNÞ, we have Lða;RiÞ2EHðNnfigÞ.
Proof. See Peleg and Winter (2002, Lemma 4.3). j
Condition (S1) says that for any alternative chosen by the SCC, each
player can be barred from better alternatives by the other players. This is a
very natural condition in the context of implementation in Nash equilibrium.
We will show (Proposition 4.3 below) that by adding the following con-
dition we obtain a set of suﬃcient conditions for constitutional implemen-
tation of a surjective SCC H.
[(S2)] Let T 1;...;T ‘ be pairwise disjoint coalitions (‘   1), Bl 2 EHðT lÞ for
each l ¼ 1;...;‘, x 2 D :¼
T‘
l¼1 Bl, and RN 2 LðAÞ
N. For each
h 2f 1;...;‘g deﬁne Dh :¼
T
l2f1;...;‘gnfhg Bl,a n dD1 :¼ A if ‘ ¼ 1. Sup-
pose that xRiDh for all i 2 T h and h 2f 1;...;‘g, and xRiD for all
i 2 Nn
S‘
l¼1 T l. Then x 2 HðRNÞ.
In words, this condition says the following. Suppose we have a number of
disjoint coalitions, each one eﬀective for a certain subset of alternatives. Note
that, by superadditivity, the union of all these coalitions (say, T) is eﬀective
for the intersection D of these sets. Now let x be an alternative in this inter-
section. For each coalition and each player in this coalition, assume that that
player prefers x to all alternatives in the intersection of the sets for which the
other coalitions are eﬀective. Similarly, for each player not in any of the
coalitions, assume that x is the best preferred alternative in D. In other words,
for each player in N, the point x is the best alternative among those for which
the coalition consisting of all players in T except, possibly, those belonging to
the coalition of that player, is eﬀective. Now condition (S2) requires x to be
chosen by the SCC. In a very rough sense, the condition can be seen as a
converse to condition (S1).
Proposition 4.3. Let H be a monotone and surjective SCC satisfying (S1) and
(S2). Then H is constitutionally implementable.
Proof. We use a game form C that is almost identical to the one in the proof
of Proposition 3.4. There are two diﬀerences.
First, in case ðbÞ, let rk ¼ð   ;xk; ;S;BÞ be the strategy of the ‘deviating’
player. If S 6¼f kg, then pðrNÞ is as before, i.e., pðrNÞ :¼ xk if xk 2 Lðx;   RkÞ and
pðrNÞ :¼ x otherwise. If S ¼f kg (and, thus, B 2 EHðfkgÞ), then by (S1) and
superadditivity of EH, Lðx;   RkÞ\B 6¼; ; let z 2 Lðx;   RkÞ\B with
z  RkðLðx;   RkÞ\BÞ. Now deﬁne pðrNÞ :¼ xk if xk 2 Lðx;   RkÞ\B, pðrNÞ :¼ x if
xk= 2Lðx;   RkÞ\B and x 2 B, and pðrNÞ :¼ z if xk= 2Lðx;   RkÞ\B and x= 2B.
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N. The proof that Hð~ RNÞ pðNEðC; ~ RNÞÞ is almost identical to
the corresponding part in the proof of Proposition 3.4. For the converse, take
rN 2 NEðC; ~ RNÞ and let a ¼ pðrNÞ. We distinguish three cases, according to
the deﬁnition of pðrNÞ.
(a) There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N and x 2 Hð  RNÞ such that ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ for
every i 2 N. Then pðrNÞ¼x ¼ a and in particular a 2 Hð  RNÞ. Take
k 2 N and y 2 Lða;   RkÞ arbitrary, and let RN 2 LðAÞ
N be a preference
proﬁle with yRjA for all j 2 N. By weak unanimity (Lemma 4.1),
y 2 HðRNÞ,s os ¼ð RN;y;1;N;fygÞ is a well deﬁned strategy in Rk.B y
case ðbÞ, we have pðrNnfkg;sÞ¼y, and since rN is a Nash equilibrium in
ðC; ~ RNÞ, we have pðrNÞ~ RkpðrNnfkg;sÞ. Hence, a~ Rky, and since y was an
arbitrary element of Lða;   RkÞ, it follows that Lða;   RkÞ Lða; ~ RkÞ. Since
also k was arbitrary and a 2 Hð  RNÞ, we have by monotonicity of H that
a 2 Hð~ RNÞ.
(b) There are   RN 2 LðAÞ
N, x 2 Hð  RNÞ, and k 2 N, such that
ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ and rk 6¼ ri for every i 2 Nnfkg. First consider
player k. Just as in part (a), we derive that a~ RkLðx;   RkÞ.
Next, consider an arbitrary player i 2 Nnfkg. Let player k announce tk in rk
and consider a strategy si 2 Ri of the form si ¼ð~ RN; ;tk þ 1;fig;AÞ. Then
pðrNnfig;siÞ is determined by case ðcÞ. In particular, pðrNnfig;siÞ~ RiB, where the
set B is equal to A if there is no decided pair, or given by B 2 EHðfkgÞ if rk is
of the form rk ¼ð   ; ;0;fkg;BÞ (in which case ðfkg;BÞ is the only decided
pair). Then a 2 B and, since rN is a Nash equilibrium, a~ RiB.
Now consider the pairs ðNnfkg;Lðx;   RkÞÞ and ðfkg;BÞ. Then B 2 EHðfkgÞ,
and, as derived, a~ RiB for all i 2 Nnfkg. By (S1), Lðx;   RkÞ2EHðNnfkgÞ. Since
a ¼ pðrNÞ is equal to x or an element of Lðx;   RkÞ, we have a 2 Lðx;   RkÞ.
Moreover, as derived, a~ RkLðx;   RkÞ. By (S2), it follows that a 2 Hð~ RNÞ.
(c) Neither ðaÞ nor ðbÞ. Let D ¼f ð T 1;B1Þ;...;ðT ‘;B‘Þg, D, and k be as in the
deﬁnition of case ðcÞ. Let si 2 Ri be of the form si ¼ð   ; ;tk þ 1;fig;AÞ for
an arbitrary i 2 N. By considering deviations si from the Nash equilib-
rium rN for a player i 2 T l for some l 2f 1;...;‘g, we obtain pðrNÞ~ RiDl.
By considering deviations si for a player i 2 Nn
S‘
l¼1 T l, we obtain
pðrNÞ~ RiD. By (S2), a ¼ pðrNÞ2Hð~ RNÞ.
(ii) EC ¼ EH.
For S ¼ N, ECðNÞ¼EHðNÞ¼PðAÞ by deﬁnition.
Let jSj¼1, say S ¼f kg.
Let B 2 EHðfkgÞ and consider a strategy rk of the form
rk ¼ð   ; ;0;fkg;BÞ2Rk. Then, by case ðbÞ or case ðcÞ, pðrk;sNnfkgÞ2B for all
sNnfkg 2 RNnfkg. Hence, B 2 ECðfkgÞ.
Next, assume B 2 ECðfkgÞ. Then there is a strategy rk 2 Rk such that
pðrk;sNnfkgÞ2B for all sNnfkg 2 RNnfkg. Suppose rk ¼ð   ; ;tk; ; Þ. By consid-
ering, for all i 2 Nnfkg, a strategy si 2 Ri of the form
si ¼ð  RN;x;tk þ 1;Nnfkg;AÞ it follows by case ðcÞ that there must be a set
B0   B with B0 2 EHðfkgÞ such that rk has the form rk ¼ð   ; ;0;fkg;B0Þ.B y
monotonicity, B 2 EHðfkgÞ.
Let 1 < jSj n   1.
390 B. Peleg et al.For B 2 EHðSÞ, consider a strategy proﬁle rS for S with each ri of the form
ri ¼ð   ; ;0;S;BÞ.B yc a s eðcÞ, we obtain B 2 ECðSÞ.
Next, assume B 2 ECðSÞ.I fjSj < n   1, then there must be T 1;...;T ‘,
B1;...;B‘, and D as in case ðcÞ, with D   B and
S‘
l¼1 T l   S. By superaddi-
tivity and monotonicity, B 2 EHðSÞ. Finally, suppose jSj¼n   1, say
S ¼ Nnfkg. Then there is a strategy proﬁle rS such that pðrS;skÞ2B for all
sk 2 Rk. Consider a strategy sk 2 Rk of the form sk ¼ð   ; ; ;fkg;AÞ.I f
pðrS;skÞ is determined by case ðcÞ, then, as before and with notations as in
ðcÞ, D   B (by varying sk)a n d
S‘
l¼1 T l   S, so by superadditivity and
monotonicity, B 2 EHðSÞ.I fpðrS;skÞ is determined by case ðbÞ, then each ri is
of the form ri ¼ð  RN;x;0;N;fxgÞ, and by varying sk we obtain Lðx;   RkÞ B.
Hence, B 2 EHðSÞ by monotonicity and (S1).
This completes the proof of this case and of the proposition. j
The game form used in the proof of Proposition 4.3 is a modiﬁcation of
the one used in the preceding section.
We know that the conditions in Proposition 4.3, apart from (S2), are also
necessary for constitutional implementation of a social choice correspon-
dence. Concerning (S2), we can show that its conclusion is necessary if the
point x in the set D can be ‘reached’, e.g., if the set D is ‘minimal’. For an
eﬀectivity function E, a coalition S and a set B 2 EðSÞ, call B minimal if no
proper subset of B is in EðSÞ.
Lemma 4.4. Let H be a surjective SCC, let C be a constitutional implemen-
tation of H,and let the premise of (S2) be fulﬁlled with D minimal in
EHð
S‘
l¼1 T lÞ. Then x 2 HðRNÞ.
Proof. Since C constitutionally implements H, there are rT l
2 RTl
for every
l ¼ 1;...;‘ such that pðrT l
;sNnTl





l¼1 T l, then pðrT;sNnTÞ2D for all sNnT 2 RNnT. Since D 2 EHðTÞ¼
ECðTÞ is minimal, there is rNnT 2 RNnT with pðrNÞ¼x. It is suﬃcient to show
that rN 2 NEðC;RNÞ. First, for every l 2f 1;...;‘g, i 2 T l, and si 2 Ri,w e
have pðrNnfig;siÞ2Dl, hence pðrNÞRipðrNnfig;siÞ since xRiDl. Second, for
every i= 2T and si 2 Ri, we have pðrNnfig;siÞ2D, hence pðrNÞRipðrNnfig;siÞ
since xRiD.S orN is a Nash equilibrium of ðC;RNÞ. j
5. Examples and independence
In this section, we present examples of social choice correspondences to which
the results of Sections 3 and 4 apply. Furthermore, we show that the condi-
tions in these results are independent.
5.1. Scoring social choice correspondences
Let W ðAÞ denote the set of all weak orders of A, i.e., the set of all complete
and transitive binary relations. All preceding results extend to preference
proﬁles from W ðAÞ
N instead of LðAÞ
N if we interpret all conditions as applying
to the asymmetric parts of preferences in W ðAÞ. Allowing indiﬀerences—as in
elements of W ðAÞ—is convenient for the now following deﬁnition of scoring
SCCs.
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ative real numbers such that s1   ...  sm and s1 < sm. For a preference
R 2 W ðAÞ and an alternative x 2 A, let ‘ðx;RÞ :¼j Lðx;RÞj and







So scores are assigned according to the vector s with the understanding that
equally preferred alternatives obtain the average of the associated scores. For
RN 2 W ðAÞ





For k ¼ 1;...;m deﬁne   sk :¼ 1
kðs1 þ   þskÞ. The social choice correspon-
dence Hs is deﬁned by
HsðRNÞ :¼f x 2 A j scoreðx;RNÞ n  smg;
hence it assigns to every preference proﬁle RN 2 W ðAÞ
N all alternatives of
average score or higher. Obviously, Hs is well-deﬁned: for every RN 2 W ðAÞ
N,
HsðRNÞ 6¼; .
Lemma 5.1. The SCC Hs is monotone and surjective. It is unanimous if and
only if sm 1 <   sm.If n > m,then EHs
ðNnfigÞ ¼ PðAÞ for every i 2 N.
Proof. Monotonicity of Hs is obvious. For surjectivity, let x 2 A and consider
the proﬁle RN where every player puts x strictly on top and is indiﬀerent
between all other alternatives. Then HsðRNÞ¼f xg.
For unanimity, it is necessary and suﬃcient that in a proﬁle with x 2 A on
top and y 2 A strictly ranked second for every player, only x is chosen. This is
the case if, and only if, nsm 1 < n  sm, hence sm 1 <   sm.
Before proving the last statement, ﬁrst observe that for all B 2 PðAÞnfAg
and T 2 PðNÞ, we have
B 2 EHs
ðTÞ,ð n  j TjÞsm þj Tj  sm jBj < n  sm: ð5Þ
(This can be seen by considering a proﬁle where the players in T put B on top
and are indiﬀerent between the alternatives not in B, and the players not in T
all put the same alternative from AnB on top: this alternative should not be
chosen.) To prove the last statement in the lemma, assume n > m.W eh a v et o
show that Nnfig is eﬀective for every singleton, hence by (5) that
sm þð n   1Þ  sm 1 < n  sm:
By a few elementary computations (in which n > m is used) it follows that this
inequality is equivalent to the inequality   sm 1 < sm, which is true by deﬁnition
of s. j
Note that Lemma 5.1 implies that Hs satisﬁes (S1) if n > m.
The next lemma provides a condition under which the SCC Hs satisﬁes
condition (S2). The condition is that only majority coalitions can have power.




for every T 2 PðNÞ with EHs
ðTÞ 6¼f Ag: ð6Þ
Then Hs satisﬁes (S2).
Proof. Let B 2 PðAÞnfAg and T 2 PðNÞ such that B 2 EHs
ðTÞ. Let
b 2 B 2 EHs
ðTÞ and RN 2 W ðAÞ
N such that b is strictly preferred to Anfbg
for all i 2 T and b is strictly preferred to Bnfbg for all i 2 NnT. In order
to prove (S2) it is, in view of (6), suﬃcient to show that b 2 HsðRNÞ or,
equivalently, jTjsm þð n  j TjÞsjBj   n  sm. Suppose this were not true,
then jTjsm þð n  j TjÞ  sjBj < n  sm. Hence, by (5), AnB 2 EHs
ðNnTÞ. Since
B 2 EHs
ðTÞ, this contradicts superadditivity of EHs
. j
Remark 5.3. Condition (6) is satisﬁed if the following holds for a score
vector s:




To see this, let B 2 PðAÞnfAg and T 2 PðNÞ. Then B 2 EHs
ðTÞ implies by (5)
that
ðn  j TjÞsm þj Tj  sm jBj < n  sm
hence
jTj >
nsm   n  sm
sm     sm jBj  
nsm   n  sm





hence (6). Conditions (7) and (6) are not equivalent (although they are quite
close). For instance, let n ¼ 5, m ¼ 3, and s ¼ð 0;4;5Þ. Then (7) does not
hold, but (6) is true.
Condition (7) is satisﬁed, for instance, if the assignment of scores in s is
determined by a nondecreasing convex function on the interval ½1;m . It also
follows by a straightforward argument from unanimity of Hs, that is, from
sm 1 <   sm (cf. Lemma 5.1).
By Proposition 4.3 and Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 we obtain:
Corollary 5.4. Let n > m and let the score vector s satisfy (6). Then Hs is
constitutionally implementable.
Thus, Corollary 5.4 presents a class of surjective but not necessarily
unanimous SCCs to which the results of Section 4 apply. The next result
follows by Remark 5.3.
Corollary 5.5. Let n > m and let the score vector s satisfy sm 1 <   sm, or,
equivalently, let Hs be unanimous. Then Hs is constitutionally implementable.




POðRNÞ :¼fx2Ajscoreðx;RNÞ n  sm and x is Pareto undominated in RNg;
for every RN 2 W ðAÞ
N. Then Hs
PO is well-deﬁned, unanimous and mono-
tone. For n > m it satisﬁes (U2), and under (6), (U1) holds as well. These
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applies:
Corollary 5.6. Let n > m and let the score vector s satisfy (6). Then Hs
PO is
constitutionally implementable.
Thus, Corollary 5.6 presents a class of unanimous SCCs to which the
results of Section 3 apply.
5.2. Veto social choice correspondences
In this section attention will be restricted again to linear orderings. We will
exhibit another class of surjective SCCs to which the results of Section 4
apply.
Let v be an integer with v   1. Say that a coalition S vetoes an alternative
x 2 A at a proﬁle RN 2 LðAÞ
N if there is a T   S with ARix for all i 2 T and
jTj v. Deﬁne the correspondence Hv by
HvðRNÞ :¼f x 2 A j there is no S 2 PðNÞ that vetoes xg;
for every RN 2 LðAÞ
N. Then Hv is a well-deﬁned social choice correspondence
(HvðRNÞ 6¼; for every RN 2 LðAÞ
N) if and only if n < mv. Further, Hv is
monotone, and it is surjective if and only if ðm   1Þv < n. If every player puts
an alternative a on top and b next, then both a and b are chosen provided that
m   3: so if m   3, then Hv is not unanimous.
In what follows we assume that ðm   1Þv < n < mv. This implies, in par-
ticular, that v > 1 and n > m.
Observe that for all B 2 PðAÞ and S 2 PðNÞ
B 2 EHv
ðSÞ,j Sj ð m  j BjÞv: ð8Þ
In particular, as n   1  ð m   1Þv, this implies EHv
ðNnfigÞ ¼ PðAÞ for every
i 2 N,s oHv satisﬁes (S1).
Lemma 5.7. Hv satisﬁes (S2).
Proof. With notations as in the deﬁnition of (S2) we have to prove
x 2 HvðRNÞ. We assume without loss of generality that Bl 6¼ A for every
l ¼ 1;...;‘. We write T :¼
S‘
l¼1 T l.
If jDj 2, then not ARix for all i 2 N.S ox is never a bottom element,
hence x 2 HvðRNÞ.







ðm  j BljÞv




  vð‘m   1  ð ‘   1ÞmÞ
¼ð m   1Þv;
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which implies that NnT cannot veto x.
Suppose that jDlj¼1 for some l 2f 1;...;‘g. Then by (8),
jTnT lj ð m   1Þv. Hence, jT lj¼j Tj j TnT lj n  ð m   1Þv < v, but also
jT lj ð m  j BljÞv by (8). Hence ðm  j BljÞv < v, a contradiction since
jBlj < m. We conclude that jDlj 2 for every l ¼ 1;...;‘ and so x is not a
bottom element of Ri for every i 2 T.
Hence, x is not vetoed by any coalition, so x 2 HvðRNÞ. j
So, by Proposition 4.3, we obtain another class of constitutionally
implementable surjective SCCs.
Corollary 5.8. Let v be an integer with v > 1 and ðm   1Þv < n < mv. Then Hv
is constitutionally implementable.
Note that these conditions are quite restrictive. From the positive angle,
they tell us that for given n > m, we need to choose n
m < v < n
m 1 in order to
obtain a well-deﬁned surjective veto correspondence. It then follows that this
correspondence is constitutionally implementable.
With appropriate restrictions on v this result can be extended to veto
social choice correspondences where other than bottom alternatives can be
vetoed.
5.3. Independence
We ﬁrst show that the conditions in Proposition 3.4 are independent.
For each RN 2 LðAÞ
N deﬁne the relative majority SCC HRM by
HRMðRNÞ :¼f x 2 A jj f i 2 N j xRiAgj   jfi 2 N j yRiAgj for all y 2 Ag:
Then HRM is unanimous and satisﬁes (U1) and (U2), but it is not monotone.
For n ¼ 5, m ¼ 3, and s ¼ð 1;2;3Þ, the scoring SCC Hs is monotone and
satisﬁes (U1) and (U2), but it is not unanimous.
The SCC H1, deﬁned by
H1ðRNÞ :¼f x 2 A jj f i 2 N j xRiAgj   1g
for every RN 2 LðAÞ
N, is unanimous, monotone, and satisﬁes (U1), but not
(U2). (Note that EH1ðSÞ¼f Ag for all S 2 PðNÞ with S 6¼ N.)
For n ¼ 8, m ¼ 3( A ¼f a;b;cg), and s ¼ð 0;2;3Þ consider the SCC ~ H
deﬁned by
~ HðRNÞ :¼f x 2 A j x is Pareto undominated and scoreðx;RNÞ 14g
for every RN 2ð AÞ
N. Then, obviously, ~ HðRNÞ 6¼;and ~ H is monotone and
unanimous. Consider a proﬁle RN with aRibRic for four diﬀerent players i
and with aRicRib for three diﬀerent players i. Then fag¼ ~ HðRNÞ; since a
was arbitrary, this proves (U2). Finally, consider a proﬁle RN with aRibRic
for all i ¼ 1;...;4. Then scoreðc;RNÞ 12, so c = 2 ~ HðRNÞ and fa;bg2
E
~ Hðf1;2;3;4gÞ. Similarly, fa;bg2E
~ Hðf5;6;7;8gÞ, so we have a violation
of (U1).
In order to prove logical independence of the conditions (S1), (S2), and
monotonicity in Proposition 4.3 (we cannot drop surjectivity otherwise the
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examples as above.
The relative majority SCC HRM is not monotone and satisﬁes (S1) and (S2)
(observe that (S1) is always implied by (U2)). The SCC H1 is monotone and
satisﬁes (S2) but not (S1). Finally, the SCC ~ H is monotone and satisﬁes (S1)
but not (S2): to see this, recall that fa;bg2E
~ Hðf1;2;3;4gÞ and
fa;bg2E
~ Hðf5;6;7;8gÞ. Take T 1 ¼f 1;2;3;4g and T 2 ¼f 5;6;7;8g, and
B1 ¼ B2 ¼f a;bg in the deﬁnition of (S2), and let a be the point x. Consider
the proﬁle RN where each player ranks c above a and a above b. Then
~ HðRNÞ¼f cg, which is a violation of (S2).
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have obtained a tight characterization of all unanimous
social choice correspondences that are constitutionally implementable. Fur-
ther, we have established a tight set of suﬃcient conditions for constitutional
implementability of social choice correspondences that are not necessarily
unanimous but only surjective. Necessity of in particular condition (S2) is still
an open problem.
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